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Institutional  reforms  associated with  changes in  power  and/or benefit  distribution  inevitably
create considerable political opposition.  The conventional view of institutional change is that it
is either in the interest of economic efficiency, or it merely redistributes income (Bromley 1989).
In this regard, interest groups form and attempt to impact the decision-making process so that the
end result best serves their interests.
Powerful vested interests of political groups may slow, divert, or even stop a desirable
reform.  T  he  larger the number of interest  groups, the more complicated the  implementation
process is likely to  be.  Recent resource-development and resource-use-improvement projects
emphasize the combination of physical and institutional investments (Cummings et al., 1996). In
such projects the sustainability of infrastructure investments is dependent on the performance of
the institutions which manage them.  Therefore, it is important, in such projects, to analyze the
level of political risk associated with the implementation of the suggested institutional reforms.
In this  regard, Eggertsson  (1997) stresses the  need for  approaches that  allow  interaction  of
economic, political, and social activities, in order to improve the design of economic policies and
minimize the likelihood of policy failure.
Recently there has been an increased emphasis on institutional reforms in development
projects in  the water sector in many  countries around the world.  These changes have been
caused by several factors, including, inter alia: increasing awareness regarding water availability;
second, most of the suitable sites for the construction of large dams and reservoirs have already
been developed; third, the increasing demands for fiscal austerity in most countries have resulted
in growing interest in least-cost alternatives for meeting water needs; fourth, increased awareness
about the environmental  impacts  related to the  construction of hydraulic  infrastructures; and
fifth, competition  by various  sectors  for scarce  water resources  has  increased  as  a  result of
growing population and increased economic activity.  These changes have caused a fundamental
shift from relying on additional construction as a means for solving water needs, to improving
water resource management and institutions of individual countries.2
There  are  several  examples  of  water-related  projects  which  combine  infrastructure
investment, with components of either institutional reforms, or other non-structural interventions
(e.g., pricing).  We provide two examples of recent water-related projects that have a mix of such
components.'
The first example is from Morocco.  The Government of the Kingdom of Morocco  is
undertaking a major long-term irrigation improvement project, estimated at $367 million (World
Bank, 1993).  The share of agricultural consumption of available water is estimated at 83% and
79% in 1990 and 2020, respectively (World Bank 1995).  Since irrigated agriculture is the major
consumer  of  available water  resources in  Morocco, this  sector is  targeted for  technical  and
institutional  reforms aimed  at improving water use efficiency.  The institutional  building  and
policy  reforms  component of the project  is aimed at improving the management  capacity  of
water suppliers, enhancing their service quality and financial sustainability.  At the same time,
water pricing policies have been modified, including all necessary legislation, to increase water
charges to better cover true operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, and to  better reflect the
scarcity value of water in Morocco.  The share of the institutional  building and policy reform
component in the original project budget was $76.3 million.
During the first three years, the project in Morocco faced delays and political difficulties,
some  of which  were  associated with  implementation of the  institutional  and  policy reforms.
These delays were mainly due to the attitude of the Government and water suppliers'  (ORMVAs)
and the Government.  The ORMVAs initial negative attitude was motivated by possible  loss of
power,  prestige,  and  additional  financial  support.  They  also  opposed  having  more
responsibilities  and  more  complicated  work  without  any  additional  compensation.  The
Government's  reluctant  attitude  may  be  explained by  the  fact  that  there  was  a  transitional
Government  unwilling  to  undertake  major  policy  changes  during  the  four  years  of  project
implementation, but that are now being implemented (Nguyen, 1998).
Additional  World Bank experience  with institutional  analysis include Brinkerhoff  (1994) who analyzed 80 ran-
domly selected projects, and Morss (1984),  who focused on African countries. Although  these two studies
provide  insight into the structure  of projects  with a significant  institutional  component,  the analysis does not
specifically  address  implemetation  problems  due to opposing  interests  of interest  groups.3
Although, the institutional changes described for the water sector are strictly internal, it
would  be  useful  to  mention  difficulties associated  with  institutional  reforms  that  have  been
experienced before in Morocco (Haggard et al., 1995 pg. 75): "In 1981, after lifting subsidies on
basic foodstuffs in conjunction with an IMF program, Morocco experienced widespread riots...  .
... the experience of  1981 was that the government had acted too  quickly, that it had  failed to
develop a compelling strategy of communication and that in lifting subsidies it had not taken into
account the cost to the poor."  As a result, the government amended the IMF  plan in 1985 by
reducing  subsidies  on  some basic foodstuffs, and  by implementing the plan  gradually.  The
implication  of  the  IMF  experience  to  our  study  are that  policy  reforms  are  likely  to  face
substantial opposition from several segments of the society--some of which may only be weak
pressure groups.  The ability to  undertake policy reforms in Morocco is dependent to  a great
extent on the synchronization of the activities over time and across society segments.
The  second  example  is  from  Pakistan.  The  Government  of  Pakistan  and  its  four
provinces are introducing major reforms in the organization and management of its irrigation and
drainage system (World Bank, 1997). These reforms are being supported by a National Drainage
Program  (NDP)  Project,  which  includes,  arnong  other  components,  an  institutional  reforn
component ($58 million) and an investment component ($683 million).  The proposed reforms
would primarily entail a shift in policy and strategic decision making responsibilities away from
federal  and  state  administered agencies  to  decentralized autonomous public  utilities  and  end
users:  Farmers'  Organizations (FOs)-including  small farmers.  The reforms would  facilitate
greater  use  of  market  mechanisms,  a  greater  role  for the  private  sector in  on-farm  capital
investment, in water allocation, and in operation and maintenance (O&M).  The reforms consist
of  mainstreaming  beneficiary  participation  i.e.,  involving  beneficiaries  substantially  in  the
construction, management  and financing of the irrigation and drainage system; redefining the
role of government to perform only its legitimate functions in the management  of the system;
establishing arrangements to ensure that service agencies carry out their fimctions by adopting
satisfactory business practices with focus on customer service and financial sustainability; and by
professionalizing public irrigation institutions.
Some of the reforms described above may reduce the economic influence of some of the
water or drainage service providers on end users, and of end users on service providers.  In this4
paper we attempt  to describe  ways and means by which such reforms  affect various  interest
groups  (including  government  agencies  and  users),  and  how  each  group  may  affect  the
implementation of each reform.  We also attempt to develop an approach to estimate the political
risks  associated  with  implementation  of  institutional  reforms  in  the  water  sector.  We  first
describe ways in which political impacts and political risks were handled in the literature dealing
with various reforms and economic adjustment projects.  The survey of the literature provides
some needed qualitative relationships observed  over the years in various countries.  Then we
propose a procedure which can be used to calculate the political risks, expressed as the likelihood
of achieving a given reform.  We use available data from the NDP project in Pakistan (World
Bank, 1997) to apply our framework; and make inkages to the political economy of the water and
drainage  sector  as  they  are  reflected  through  the  NDP  project.  We  focus  on  the  major
institutional reforms and the main.interest  groups associated with the NDP.  We conclude by
providing for risk mitigating and management that should assist the government of Pakistan to
cope with the political risks of the various reforms in the NDP.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS, POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND POLITICAL
RISK ASSESSMENT
To be able to  assess the political risks associated with institutional reforms,  it is necessary to
know how the stakeholders (also called interest groups or players) are affected by the reforms,
what their interests are, and their ability to impact the reforms.  A quantitative evaluation of risk
can be estimated once the extent of the political effects on the institutional reforms is known.
Although  the  literature  contains  a  rich  set  of  studies  on  the  political  economy  of
institutional reforms in general (Paul, 1990; Azis, 1994; Bromley, 1989; Nelson,  1992; Haggard
et al., 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Stallings and Brock, 1993), and in the agricultural sector in
particular (Bhalla,  1991; Brandao and Carvalho, 1991; Garcia, 1991; Nabi,  1986; Hamid et al.,
1991; Rose-Ackerman  and  Evenson,  1985;  Sturzenegger,  1991), very  few  studies  exist that
address the political  economy of reforms in the water sector.  In  addition, to the best  of our
knowledge the literature does not provide direct quantitative estimates of political influence and
the political risk of reforms.  However, the available literature provides several directions which5
will be reviewed later, and which will be used as a basis for the framework to be developed in
this paper.
Haggard  et al., (1997) provide an excellent background of the main  issues of political
feasibility of adjustment in developing countries.  Although their  study addresses the broader
issue of adjustment programs imposed on a country, such as involving international agencies and
governmenats, many  of  the  findings,  especially  those  associated  with  the  tactics  of  reform
implementation, the role of interest groups, and the behavior of the social groups, are relevant to
the case dealt with in this paper.
As  correctly  pointed  out  by  Haggard  et  al.  (1995),  interest-group  analysis  is  not
straightforward,  and especially  so as  characteristics of their behavior in  developing  countries
differ significantly from those of developed countries.  Several limitations affect our ability to
analyze  interest  group  impact.  They  include  (1)  collective action  problems-the  ability  of
groups to organize and influence; (2) problems in identifying exogenous-endogenous reactions to
the reform. design--i.e., the  design and the implementation  sequence affect the interest  group
reaction, and (3) problems in identifying mechanisms through which interests are translated into
policy-e.g.,  strikes, bribes, etc.  Haggard et al. (1995) also point out that (1) dormant interest
groups may become acute under certain circumstances, (2) unexpected coalition combinations
may take place under certain circumstances, and (3) the combination of a-priori weak interest
groups ancd  certain mechanisms of translating their interests, may be found very  effective (e.g.,
violent demonstrations of the poor).
Paul (1990) reviewed 55 World Bank's  Sector Adjustment Operations between 1983 and
1987 that  include institutional reforms in the agricultural, trade and industry sectors.  Among
other  interesting  results,  he  found  that  in  some  cases  the  entrenched political  and  hostile
bureaucratic forces within the institutions pose serious problem.  Using the example of Brazil's
trade reforn,  political resistance and lack of commitment on the part of the export credit agency
of the Central Bank of Brazil contributed to the problems of implementing the necessary reforms.
Stallings  and  Brock  (1993) refer to  the lessons from  the  economic reforms  in  Chile
between  1973 and  1990.  Referring to two reforms-trade  liberalization and privatization, the
authors foLmd  that in the case of trade reforms, creation of coalitions that were a priori opposed
to the reforms, was expected.  However, losers who had more reasons to organize had much less6
ability to do so.  In the case of privatization, pressure for reform came from the government and
from the business sector, while labor organizations were not active in the process.
Sturzenegger (1991) described agricultural price interventions in Argentina between 1960
and  1985.  Lobbying for and  against this  type of  intervention, interest  group activities  took
various forms, such as meeting with policy makers, conducting studies that support the interest
group's  point  of view,  monetary  contributions  to  legislators,  public  opinion campaigns,  and
direct participation in government by members of interested groups.  The author recognized the
relative advantage of various groups to organize an effective lobby, both in terms of the results
and the associated influence cost.  The two interest groups-the  agrarian lobby and the industrial
lobby-differed  in that respect.  In addition, the author identified conditions (price and direct tax
levels) for the intensive involvement of the agrarian sector.  Since the industrial sector included
both input providers  and agricultural  product processors, the industrial group faced  opposing
interests.
There is no prescription  for measuring political impact and political power of  various
players involved in institutional change, nor does a formula exist for the cases described earlier.
In most cases there is also no data that can directly measure power and influence.
The  empirical  literature suggests the use of proxies  to  measure political  influence of
interest groups.  For example, Ando (1997) estimated pressure by interest groups to impact the
Endangered Species Act in the USA, by using a number of comments submitted by groups for
and against a particular species to be included in the Act.  Cukierman and Webb (1997) measured
political influence on central banks'  policies in various countries by looking at the probability
that a central bank governor will be replaced shortly after a political change in governnent.
Rose-Ackerman  (1997)  reviewed  several  ways  in  which  parties  may  influence  the
executive, legislative, and the legal systems by corruptive bribes.  Influencing by bribes has a
clear advantage to the party that uses it as an influential tool.  For example, bribery allows the
party to  increase allocation  of scarce resources, reduce production  costs, increase  production
quotas, and buy judicial decisions.
Nelson  (1992)  compared  various  institutional  reforms  vis-a-vis the  relation  between
various actors that have a stake in the reform outcome, such as unions, governnents,  political
parties, and the urban and rural populations.  Influence by those parties was detected in various7
countries that  undertake  institutional  change  and  economic adjustment  programs.  The main
influencing means were strikes, protests and riots.
Browne and Paik (1994) studied the support and opposition to farm policy initiatives by
U.S. legislators.  Their main finding was that policy makers support certain policies lobbied by
the agricultural sector only if they serve another interest group (e.g., non-farm sector) that is part
of  their  constituency.  They  measured  political  influence  of  interest  groups  by  density  of
farm/non-farm population and by farm/blue collar population shares.  The key findings were that
policy  makers  support agricultural policies  only  if  they serve  interests of  other constituency
groupsthat are closely associated with the agricultural sector.
Rose-Ackerman  and  Evenson  (1985)  estimated  the  determinants  of  allocation  of
agricultural  research  and  extension funds  by  state policy  makers.  They  found that  farmers
influence of policy makers is correlated with their share in the state population, with farm income
share, and with the number of farmer-elected legislators.
From the studies surveyed it can be generalized that reforms of any kind are likely to face
the opposition  and support of certain groups.  The level of opposition or  support is, in turn,
deternined  by the change of power and benefits of each affected group compared with the status
quo.  Relforms may create new coalitions that were  not in place,  or were not  even predicted
before.  T'he ability of a group to influence the implementation of a reform is a function of many
factors, and is very complicated to generalize.
ESTIMATING  POLITICAL  RISKS  OF INSTITUTIONAL  REFORMS
Establishing  a  quantitative framework to  assess the  likelihood of  accomplishing institutional
reforms associated with a specific project is not a straightforward task.  Supporting data from
which probabilities can be calculated, do not generally exist.  However, a useful procedure for
estimation of such probabilities has been suggested by Raiffa (1982), and is used in association
with a  Delphi approach (Preble,  1983; Woudenberg, 1991; Buck et al., 1993) to  estimate the
probabilities for achieving the desired reforms.  The process consists of: (i) an evaluation of the8
potential  winners  and  losers 2 from  the  reforms;  (ii)  identification  of  the  various  reform
performance levels; (iii) identification of means by which the various parties may influence the
level of achievement of various reforms; (iv) identification of costs to (i.e., effort required by)
each party to influence the achievement levels; and (v) thereafter applying the Delphi approach
to estimate probabilities of level of achievement of each reform.
The  approach  is  based  on  a  two  tier  procedure.  The  first  tier  is  comprised  of  an
evaluation  of  the  process  of  reform  implementation,  identifying  positively  net  gainers  and
negatively net losers, the parties'  objection to and support of each reform, and the cost, to each
party,  of influencing the reform outcomes.  Using the information in the  first tier,  a  Delphi
approach  is  applied  in  the  second  tier to  calculate probabilities  of  risk  associated  with  the
implementation of the analyzed reforms.  The process is presented in Figure  1 and described in
detail in the following sections.
IDENTIFICATION  OF  THE  PLAYERS  AND THE  REFORMS
If the number of players and the number of reforms cannot easily be handled, then a selection of
a sub-set of players and reforms must be performed to ensure a workable set while capturing the
essence of the problem.  For example, reforms with relatively stable outcomes, and players with
little influence should be eliminated from the analysis.
PLAYERS'  INFLUENCE  ON THE REFORMS
It is expected that each of the institutional reforms will be affected by both political opposition
on the part of some  players, and political  support on the part of other players.  The level of
achievement and the time  frame for implementation of a particular reform can be affected by
active opposition or support.  The actual achievement level will be the outcome of that process. 3
2 The term "winners and losers"  or "gainers and losers",  taken from the political  economy  literature  (e.g., Stallings
and Brock, 1993,  pg. 100;  and Bhalla, 1991,  pg. 222), is used here in conjunction  with parties who may gain
more and parties  who may gain less  from a prospective  reform.
3 For purposes of this analysis,  we have held all other potential  determinants  of performance  outcome constant.
These include such variables  as implementation  capacity,  the policy environment,  resource endouments  and
initial  allocations, the overall  economic  environment,  and natural  factors.9
There are various means by which players interfere in the reform's  implementation process.  It
should be noted that some players may support or oppose a given reform in a passive way.
PLAYERS' TRANSACTION  COST OF INFLUENCING  REFORMS' LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT
The cost of influencing a particular player is a function of his/her existing political power, and of
the magnitude of change it wishes to incorporate into the proposed reform. Players can influence
policy makers by demonstrations, by meetings and presentation of their political  positions,  or
simply by monetary  means of future support of a policy maker that affect  his/her immediate
decision.
ESTIMAT][NG  THE LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT
Based on the variety of actions and the cost (also measured by level of effort) associated with the
players'  attempt  to  affect  the  reform, a  measure  of  the reforms'  achievement  level  can  be
estimated  Three levels of achievement are considered in our framework: a high/full  level, a
medium/partial  level and a low/failure level.  Achievement can be measured both in terms of
fulfillment of the reform components, and the time frame needed for such achievement.
ESTIMATING  THE LIKELIHOOD  OF ACHIEVEMENT  OF THE VARIOUS  REFORMS'  LEVELS  - THE DELPHI
PROCESS
The information provided in the tier one procedure is then used in a Delphi process (Preble,
1983).  We assumed that the reforms are independent of each other, so implementation of one
reform does not affect the others. 4 To simplify, we assumed further that achievement levels are
not continuous.  We ranked achievement levels as "Low", "Medium", "High", and "Very High."
We attached a four-stage value scale to the probability for achieving each level, namely: (1) Low
0-25 percent,  (2) Medium 26-50 percent, (3) High 51-75 percent, and  (4) Very High 75-100
percent.  We  repeated  the  Delphi  process  until  convergence  was  achieved.  We  defined
convergence as the attainment of an empirically determined level  (CV)  of the coefficient  of
variation (CV).
4This assumption  is necessary  for analytical  purposes  in order to apply the Delphi  technique. In reality,  the reforms
can be expected to have complex and dynamic interactions that would require more sophisticated techniques to
analyz-. or predict.10
Figure 1: A process for estimating the political risk associated with institutional reforms
Evaluation  of the potential  winners
and losers from the reforms
Identification  of the various reform
performance  levels
Identification  of means by which the various parties
could influence  the level of achievement  of various reforms
Application  of the Delphi process
Reporting
Probabilities  Repetition of the Delphi process as necessary
POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF THE  WATER AND DRAINAGE SECTOR  IN PAKISTAN
Because data was available for the NDP project in Pakistan (World Bank, 1997), we applied the
analytical framework from the previous section to estimate the political risk of institutional re-
forms in the water and drainage sector in Pakistan.
THE  AGRARIAN ECONOMY
An understanding of the country's  agrarian economy is essential to the proper realization of the
political economy of the water and drainage sector in Pakistan, at least among the various  seg-
ments of the fanning community. Naved et al. (1991) and Nabi et al. (1986) provide an excellent
background on the agrarian sector of Pakistan.  The agrarian sector of Pakistan is characterized11
by big income distribution  differences  between different  types of agricultural  producers. Thus,
landowners  vs. tenants, and big vs. small farmers  will benefit differently  from various input and
output pricing reforms. We postulated  that institutional  reforms  would also benefit them differ-
ently.
Nabi et al. (1986,  pg. 72) argued  that, in Pakistan,  subsidies  to factors  of production,  such
as water, do not reach the targeted population  for which they are intended.  They argue that
"What is generally  ignored when such subsidies are advocated  is that because of the existing
distribution  of assets and power, all farmers do not have equal access to inputs... subsidies  on
water is a perfect example of this.  Water rates in Pakistan  are highly subsidized  supposedly  to
benefit small farmers  but most of this subsidy  goes to large farmers  because of unequal access to
water."
In another  study,  Hamid  et al. (1991)  estimated  that without  price intervention  the income
of Pakislani  small farmers  in 1980  would  have been 2.4-2.8  times higher, and that of large farm-
ers 3.0-3.5 times higher than with intervention. As predicted,  it has been confirmed  that large
farmers  in Pakistan  have opposed price intervention  in agriculture  because  they have more gains
from the status quo in agriculture.
Although small and big farmers  in Pakistan are only two of several stakeholders  in the
water reform called upon, the above discussion  demonstrates  how both groups would relate to
the proposed  institutional  reforms  under  NDP.
THE IRRIGATION  SYSTEM
Pakistan has the largest integrated  irrigation  network  in the world. The system is fed by
the waters of the Indus River  and its tributaries. Since 1947,  Pakistan  has implemented  the Indus
Basin Replacement Works Project (IBRWP) with the World Bank's help as the lead donor.
Under  the IBRWP,  39.54 million  acres 5 were brought  under  irrigation. The salient  features  of the
system are three major storage  reservoirs,  namely  Tarbela  and Chashma  on the Indus River, and
Mangla on the Jhelum River; 19 barrages; 12 inter-river  link canals; 43 independent  irrigation
5  1 acre  = 0.4 hectare12
canal commands; and over 107,000 watercourses which are complemented by a surface drainage
system comparable in size.  The length of canals totals 61,000 kms, and in addition watercourses,
farm channels and field ditches cover another 1.6 million kms.  The system draws an average of
106 million acre  feet 6 (MAF) of  surface water each year for irrigation,  supplemented by  an
annual groundwater pumpage of some 43 MAF.  With nearly 80 percent of the agricultural land
being under irrigation, irrigated agriculture contributes significantly to the economy of Pakistan,
where 25 percent of GDP, 50 percent of employment, and 70% of export revenues (directly and
indirectly), are from agriculture (World Bank, 1997).
PRESENT  STATUS
Although  irrigated  agriculture contributes  significantly to  the country's  economy,  Pakistan's
irrigated  agriculture  suffers  from  waterlogging  and  salinity,  over-exploitation  of  fresh
groundwater, low efficiency in delivery and use of irrigation water, inequitable distribution and
unreliable  delivery  of  water,  and  from  insufficient  cost  recovery  of  irrigation  and  drainage
charges.  Waterlogging and  salinity are the principal threats to  the sustainability  of irrigated
agriculture in Pakistan.  Nearly thirty eight percent of the Gross Commanded Area  (GCA) is
waterlogged,  of which  15 percent is severely waterlogged.  Fourteen percent of the surface is
saline, of which  6 percent is severely saline.  Salinity is estimated to rob farmers of about 25
percent of the potential production of major crops.  Due to age, overuse and poor maintenance,
the efficiency of delivery of the canal system is low, ranging from 35 to 40 percent from canal
head to the root zone.  Furthermore, the system which is based on gravity flow, is supply-based
and has low use-efficiency.  Inefficient water delivery and use also mean that, in reality, water
does not reach many users toward  the tail-end of the system.  Inequity in the distribution  of
surface  water-due  to  deliveries  less  than  designed  levels,  poor  O&M,  and  even  illegal
diversion-is  a major concern in Pakistan.  Operation and maintenance is inadequately financed.
Cost  recovery  of  O&M  is  perennially  inadequate.  For  example,  the  gap  between  O&M
expenditures and recoveries in Punjab was 62 percent in 1994-95, and increased to 74 percent in
1995-96; and the gap between O&M expenditures and revenues in Sindh was 89 percent in 1994-
6 1 acre-foot = 1235 cubic meters13
95 and 88 percent in 1995-96.  Many users and polluters of drains do not even pay for the use of
drainage infrastructure.  For example, urban centers and industries dispose of municipal waste
and  toxic  effluents  in  canals  and  drains  without payment  or  regulation.  The poor  state  of
drainage O&M is reflected in the periodic need for rehabilitation at roughly five year intervals.
These problems have been identified to result from several underlying factors, including public
sector  ineifficiencies, structure of the  agrarian  society, the  land tenure  system,  the  irrigation
system design, and the political economy resulting from the interplay of all these factors.  Similar
to the situation pertaining to the agricultural sector, the development of a smoothly functioning
water and land market is considered essential to eventual resolution of the sector's  problems.
Institutional and regulatory reforms that facilitates market efficiency and private sector activities
are  perhaps  the  most  obvious  route  for  implementation  of  these  developments.  The
government's  role  should  be  drastically  reduced  where  market  failure  is  not  an  issue  and
governmerLt  inefficiency is evident (Faruqee, 1995a, b).
A new strategy for water resources development in Pakistan has been formulated as part
of the NDP project.  It seeks to introduce and mainstream a comprehensive approach to River
Basin Management (RBM); to enhance the knowledge base to adopt sound technical solutions to
drainage; and to reduce fiscal dependency especially for on-farm drainage.  The strategy consists
of the following inter-linked parts: (i) restructuring the Provincial Irrigation Departments (PIDs)
to form Public Utilities (PUs) around canal commands; (ii) actively promoting the formation and
development  of Farmer Organizations (FOs);  (iii) strengthening  federal agencies, notably  the
Water and Power Development Authority's  (WAPDA's) Water Wing, to better implement their
federal responsibilities; and (iv) initiating the process of formalizing water rights and eventually
of  water  rnarkets, too.  The  strategy is  clearly dependent  on  the  country's  strong  political
commitmenit  to implement genuine reform in the sector under a properly defined division of roles
arnong public  sector, community groups, and the private  sector, and within the public  sector
among the Federal, Provincial, and local governments.  The reform program is also dependent
upon a decentralized, efficient and participatory institutional apparatus for coordination planning,
regulation, construction, financing, management and O&M.14
THE REFORMS
A package of major reforms has been agreed within the framework  of the NDP project.  The
reforms consist primarily of decentralization  and management  transfer of the irrigation and
drainage system from Provincial Irrigation Departments (PIDs) to  a  multi-tier system of
autonomous  institutions with clearly defined roles and responsibilities  within the system, and
with a firm commitment  to phase out subsidies  for O&M in seven  to ten years. The hierarchy  of
institutions  and their roles and responsibilities  are summarized  below: (i) the role of WAPDA's
Water  Wing would  be re-oriented  away  from intra-provintial  construction  to a wider spectrum  of
inter-provincial  functions  (including  custodial  stewardship  of the Indus Basin/River  aquifer);  (ii)
PIDs would be  converted into autonomous Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authorities
(PIDAs),  with responsibility  for the intra-provincial  aspects  of the system from barrages  to canal
headworks,  and from main drains  that cross canal  commands  and major drainage  basins to inter-
Provincial  drains operated  and maintained  by WAPDA;  (iii) self-accounting  Area Water Boards
(AWBs), initially set up as public utility pilot organizations,  would eventually be established
around all canal commands to take over and manage the irrigation and drainage system from
canal headworks  to distributaries/minors  operated  by Farmer Organizations  (FOs), and from the
branch drains operated by FOs to main drains operated by PIDAs; and (iv) FOs owned and
controlled by farmers would also be encouraged,  through a series of pilots, to take over and
manage  the irrigation  and drainage  system below  the distributaries/minors  and subdrains  feeding
into branch drains operated by AWBs. 7 The FO pilots would be expanded gradually and
modified to  incorporate  the lessons of experience or research.  The legal framework for the
institutional  reforms  has been established  with the enactrnent  of the PIDA Acts in all Provinces.
The Federal Goverunent also intends to reorient the functions  and organization  of WAPDA's
Water Wing towards coordinated  management  and regulation  of the Indus Basin, and streamline
WAPDA's organization,  intemal policies  and procedures  to increase  its overall  efficiency.
A series of parallel  project and program interventions  supported  by the World Bank, Asian Development  Bank,
and other donors are under preparation  to promote  the formnation  of Farmer Organizations  (FOs) on a more
extensive  basis than is envisaged  under the NDP. Thus eventually,  the NDP would  focus its reform program
on the tier above FOs.15
THE RISKS
As is inherent  in any major reform  program,  the institutional  reforms  discussed  above carry very
significant  risks. The proposed  institutional  reforms,  if fully implemented,  would be expected  to
significan,tly  affect the existing power relationships  and alliances  in rural Pakistan.  While the
reforms largely seek 'win-win' situations, the perceived (and in part, real) threat of loss of
control over the system,  particularly  by feudal  landlords  who are unaccustomed  to sharing  water
and power, and by irrigation  bureaucrats  with financial  ties to these interests,  who also stand to
benefit fiom the  continuation of the institutional status quo, could provoke strong adverse
reactions.  Large and powerful landlords view the  proposed transformation of  PIDs  into
autonomous PIDAs and  AWBs, the  formation of  FOs  and  the  transfer of  management
responsibilities  of the tertiary system to these FOs, and the establishment  of water rights as
potential  threats to their financial  and political  rural power bases. They also view these changes
as a threat to their traditional  control  over the irrigation  and drainage  system in particular,  and the
social structure  (feudal system)  in general. Some sections  of the PIDs, which when transformed
would be faced with a hard budget constraint,  more accountability,  financial  transparency  and
scrutiny, ;and  possibly reduced costs and staffing, might view the reforms as threats to their
power, authority and rent-seeking  opportunities. Similarly,  the proposed  strategic reorientation
of  WAPDA which seeks to  transform WAPDA's role from large-scale construction to  a
knowledge-based  RBM organization,  and the transfer  under  the NDP of its construction  activities
in intra-provincial  and on-farm infrastructure  to PIDAs, AWBs and FOs, could be viewed by
some as a diminution of WAPDA's role in management  of the irrigation  and drainage system.
There is a risk that these vested interests (some of which may have significant political and
financial clout) would slow, or even stop, reform.  As predicted, the proposed reforms have
already provoked strong adverse reactions from these opponents in the  form of spreading
misinformation, organized political opposition, and bureaucratic delays and stalling tactics
including continuous whittling down of reform proposals at various stages during 1996-1998.
However,  this opposition  has ebbed somewhat  as the project entered the implemented  phase.
The sense of threat  is also subsiding  as stakeholders  perceive  that the proposed  reforms  are either
less harmilfl to their interests than initially perceived,  or more collaborative  and transparent  in
approach  than they originally  expected.16
Effective FOs will ultimately be essential for the financial sustainability of the irrigation
and drainage system.  FOs are crucial not only for transferring responsibilities for O&M of the
tertiary system  (i.e., on-farm drainage and  irrigation up to  the minor/distributary  level)  from
government to users, but also and more importantly to ensure that that the AWBs and PIDAs are
held accountable  for  service  delivery,  maintenance of physical  structures, cost-effectiveness,
accurate assessment of charges, and to bring user discipline to water distribution.  However, there
is a risk that formation of genuine FOs may be very slow especially since the proposed FOs are
to be established  in a highly differentiated environment with respect to  land ownership, water
rights and economic needs, and with a mixed record from Water Users Associations and farmers'
cooperatives.  Feudal  landlords could use  their existing  social power-hold  to  frustrate  social
mobilization efforts and prevent formation of FOs.  There is also a risk that the proposed FOs
could be dominated by feudal landlords, undermining social justice and thereby be  ineffective.
Finally, there is a risk of bureaucratic impediments that could prevent the FOs from taking over
management  responsibilities  for  the  tertiary  system,  despite  the  enactment  of  enabling
legalization under the PIDA Acts.  The loss in terms of equity, cost recovery, and accountability
would be significant, and their impacts on O&M of the system (through losses on service quality
and cost recovery) would also be significant.  In addition,  slow formation of FOs would also
disrupt the strategy to improve O&M of the tertiary system by transferring responsibility to user
groups.
ESTIMATING THE POLITICAL RISK OF THE NDP REFORMS
We illustrate below how we used the analytical framework suggested earlier to estimate the po-
litical risk of NDP reforms.
FOCUSING ON THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL REFORMS AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE PLAYERS
In carrying out the risk assessment, we focused on the following reforms: (i) the transformation
of PIDs into decentralized PIDAs and AWBs that have the potential to become operationally
autonomous, effective, financially viable, and professionally managed; (ii) the establishment of
FOs  and  the  transfer  of  responsibilities  for  management  of  the  system  at  the  minor  and
distributary  level  and  small  drains to  FOs;  (iii) the involvement  of the private  sector in  the17
carrying  out  of  O&M through  Performance  Contracts;  (iv)  the redefinition  of the  operating
jurisdictions  of the various  institutions in the water sector; and (v) the establishment of water
rights and formation of water markets in project-affected areas.
The NDP reforms can be divided roughly into four heirarchical categories: (1) reforms at
the national  sector planning  level,  (2) reforms  at the  federal  (WAPDA) executing  level,  (3)
reforms at the provincial planning and executing level, and (4) reforms at the on-farm drainage
level.  To keep the analysis manageable, we selected a subset of five reforms which are of greater
analytical interest.  These reforms are described in Matrix 1 below.  The number of players is
also relatively large.  Groups and individuals affected by the reforms, and in the position to affect
the outcome  of the reforms,  include, for example the Government of Pakistan, its leaders and
agencies, WAPDA, provincial governments and their leaders and agencies, local organizations,
the media,  affected officials,  farmers'  groups, and  ordinary farmers.  [A complete  list of the
players involved can be found in World Bank (1997).]  Even within each group, there are either
different subgroups or individuals that should be considered separately.  For example, different
parts  and  inldividuals in  WAPDA  may have opposing  interests  and  abilities  in  affecting the
outcome of various reforms.  Big farmers and small farmners  have different roles and should also
be treated  separately.  With the exception of the farming community, which  we divided  into
"big"  and "small" farmers, we categorized all other organizations and groups in the analysis as
representing  one point of view.  The players we considered for the analysis are mentioned in
Table 1, and their interaction with the reforms is explained also in Matrix 1.
How  THE PLAYERS  COULD AFFECT  THE  REFORMS
There  are a variety  of means by which parties may affect reforms.  Each party may prefer a
subset of means based on their relative effectiveness and cost.  We describe the means by which
potential players might influence the various reforms in Matrix 2 below.  It should be noted that
it is possible that two players using similar vehicles to influence the reforms'  achievement levels
may end up having different actual impacts.18
Table 1: The major players associated with the water and drainage reforms in Pakistan
Player's Abbreviation  Player's Description
AWBs  Area Water Boards
FOs  Farmer  Organizations
I&D  Irrigation  and Drainage
O&M  Operation  and Maintenance
PADs  Provincial  Agriculture  Departments
PFDs  Provincial  Finance  Departments,  Revenue  Depts.,  Law Depts.,  Audit Depts.
PIDs  Provincial  Irrigation  Departments
PIDAs  Provincial  Irrigation  and Drainage  Authorities
WAPDA  Water and Power  Development  Authority
COST  OF INFLUENCING  REFORMS'  LEVEL  OF ACHIEVEMENT
Matrix  3 below describes the cost to the various  parties of impacting the reform achievement
levels.  The matrix reveals several interesting features.  First, the cost or effort level and the level
of reform achievement would, in general, be directly correlated for a party which  supports the
reform  (i.e., the cost  or effort required by this  party would progressively increase  in order to
achieve a higher level of reform progress).  Correspondingly, the cost or effort level and level of
reform achievement would,  in  general be  inversely correlated  for a party  which  opposes the
reform (i.e., the  cost or effort required by this party would progressively increase  in  order to
reduce the level of reform progress).  Second, a party which is a passive supporter or opponent of
a reform would have to incur a high  cost to  influence the reform achievement level.  This  is
because this party has several other responsibilities and interests.  The time and effort devoted to
the reforms  has  a high  opportunity  cost.  Also in  case of small  farmers, the cost  and  effort
involved in organizing them  into groups which could actively influence the reform levels are
very high.  Third, some reforms  such as the establishment of water rights and the formation of
water  markets  are  of  a  complicated  nature  and  require  a  number  of  actions  for  their
implementation.  Therefore,  such reforms  involve  very high  cost/effort  by the  supporters  for
success, and very little cost/effort by the opponents for failure.19
LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT
Matrix 4 presents  a measure of the reforms'  achievement level, based on the variety  of actions
and the cost associated with the players'  attempt to influence the reform.  As mentioned earlier,
we measured  achievement both in terms of fulfillment of the reformn  components and the time
frame needed for such achievement.
THE DELPHI PROCESS
We provided the information in the tier one procedure (Matrices 1-4) to a panel of  12 experts
familiar  with the  water and drainage  sectors in  Pakistan; whom  we selected  from  fr5om the
developmnent  finance agencies sponsoring the project and from other international agencies.  We
did not select experts from any of the interest groups associated with the reforms.  We asked each
expert to  assign a range of probabilities to  each of three possible reform achievement  levels,
based on the scales of achievement and a set of likelihood values that were presented before.
Only 7 experts responded to the questionnaire.  In the first round of the Delphi process,
we  asked  the  participants  to  fill  in  Matrix  5  below  with  probabilities  for  three  reforms
achieveraent  levels.  We analyzed the results of the first round (Table 2), and  found that the
coefficients of variation (CV) for reforms 1 and 2 were relatively high (>50 percent).'  Therefore,
we initiated a second round of the Delphi process for reforms  1 and 2 only.  The second round of
the Delphi process yielded  CV values below  50 percent  (Table 3), which replaced the values
reported for reforms 1 and 2 in Table 2.
Table  2: Probabilities assigned  to reforms'  achievement levels, and CV values, Round  1, All
reforns
Reform  1  2  3  4  5
Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High  Low  Med IHigh  Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High
Probability 1.428 2.857 1.714 2.000 2.285 2.000 1.428 2.857 2.142 2.428 2.000  1.142 1.571 2.428  1.571
CV  0.509 0.291 0.513 0.654 0.450 0.534 0.509 0.291 0.388 0.372 0.26710.306 0.463 0.372 0.463
Note: Probability values are 1 -0-25%;  2 _ 25-50%; 3 _ 50-75%; 4 - 75-100%
aWoudenberg  (1991) suggest a 50 percent value for repeating the Delphi process in public sector studies.20
Table 3: Probabilities  assigned to  the reforms'  achievement levels, and CV values, Round 2,
Reforms 1 and 2
Reform  2
Low  Mediurn  High  Low  Medium  High
Probability  1.285  2.857  1.571  1.428  2.428  1.571
CV  0.351  0.291  0.463  0.346  0.372  0.463
Note: Probability values are 1 _ 0-25%; 2 - 25-50%; 3 = 50-75%; 4 _ 75-100%
We present the  consolidated values from the Delphi process  in  Table  4.  The values
should be read in the following way:  For example, for reform 1, a low achievement level was
assigned a (low +) probability, a medium achievement level was assigned a (high -) probability,
and a high achievement level was assigned a (medium -) probability.  Reform 3 was assigned the
highest probability, and reform 4 was assigned the lowest probability for high achievement level.
Reform 4 was also assigned the highest probability for the low achievement level.
Table 4: Final Delphi probability values of reforms' achievement levels
Reform  1  2  3  4  5
Low achievement  1.3  1.4  1.4  2.4  1.6
Med Achievement  2.9  2.4  2.9  2.0  2.4
High Achievement  1.6  1.6  2.1  1.1  1.6
Note: Probability values are 1 = 0-25%; 2 = 25-50%; 3 = 50-75%; 4  75-100%
DISCUSSION
As is the case in many reforns,  information on the political parameters of the various  interest
groups is not available to policy makers so that they can evaluate the likelihood of success of the
proposed  reforms.  A  Delphi  process,  as  suggested  in  this  paper,  may  provide  a  sound
mechanism to  address such data needs.  There are several questions, however,  that  should be
addressed  in generalizing  the results of this study.  First, is the policy maker better  off when
possessing the information provided by the Delphi approach?  Second, to what extent does the21
composiltion of experts affect the results of the Delphi approach?  And third, should the Delphi
approach be used repeatedly over the reform implementation process?
The answers to the above questions depend on whether or not there is another alternative
available  for the  same purpose, and  on the alternative cost associated  with reform  failure  or
partial  achievement.  The  Delphi  approach is  based  on  the  best  information  available,  and
provides direct assessment (and not proxies) of political risks.  Therefore, they should provide
policy mlakers  with a sound estimate of political risk.  However, and this is also an answer to the
second question, the design of the experts sample is critical.  To prevent bias in the assessment,
the experts sample should carefully be assembled (as is the case with many other sampling issues
in  statistical  analyses).  Instructions  for  Delphi  respondents  can  be  found  in  literature  that
documents the application of the technique.  Finally, as was suggested by one of our reviewers,
the Delphi process could be used repeatedly over the course of the reform implementation.  This
may provide the trend of the implementation likelihood of the reform.  The design of a repeated
Delphi process should be the subject of a different study.
In assessing the political risk associated with the process of institutional reforms in the
water and drainage sector in Pakistan, we assumed several simplifying assumptions with regard
to both the reforms and the players.  We selected a subset of significant institutions, and focused
on major players.  Assuming that the reforms are independent of each other allowed us to focus
on each reform separately.
The results of the political risk assessment suggest that:
*  Reform I (Transformation of PIDs into autonomous PIDAs and AWBs) has high chances for
medium and high achievement levels.
*  Reform  2  (Transfer of  responsibilities for management  of  the  systems at the  minor  and
distributary  level  and  small  drains  to  FOs)  has  medium  chances  for  medium  and  high
achievement levels.
*  Refoim 3 (Performance contracts awarded to the private sector for carrying out O&M of I&D
infrastructure) has very high chances for medium and high achievement levels.
*  Refoim  4  (Establishment  of  water rights  and  formation  of  water market)  has  very  high
chances for low and medium achievement levels.22
Reform 5 (Defining the operational jurisdictions of various institutions in the water sector)
has medium chances for low, medium and high achievement levels.
The nature of the reforms  is such that  each of the individual reforms, if implemented,
would provide benefits of their own.  Therefore, although there are inter-linkages  among the
various reforms, implementation could be phased wherever necessary.  The sequencing of the re-
forms could take into the account the relative cost and chances of achievement i.e., reforms that
have a high chance of achievement or those in which the level of achievement is potentially high
could be implemented early on, and those that have a low chance of achievement or in which the
level of achievement is potentially low could be sequenced later in the reform process, after some
initial pilots and studies have been carried out.23
ANNEX: RISK MITIGATION AND MANAGEMENT
Given the results estimating the project's political risks, it is possible to prepare a risk mitigation
and management strategy, that will allow the project sponsors to address risk events when and
where they occur.
RISK-MITIGATION
Demonstration  of  strong  political  commitment  and  leadership  by  the  Federal  Government,
Provincial  Govermments, and  WAPDA  to  follow  through  with  the  institutional  reforms,
especially  regarding  decentralization  and management  transfer of the  irrigation and  drainage
system is crucial to mitigating this risk.  So far, this has been forthcoming.  The ownership for
the reformns  at the highest levels is strong especially since the institutional reform strategy was
formulated by the Federal Government based on its assessment of the reforms'  likely ownership
by  the  people  of  Pakistan  and  chances  of  success  in  Pakistan's  environment.  The reform
program  was first endorsed  at the highest political levels  on August  19, 1995 (at a meeting
involving the President, Prime Minister, the four Provincial Chief Ministers, Cabinet officials,
and Secretaries from the Borrower and all the four Provinces, Including politicians, organized
farmer groups, Chambers of Agriculture, Provincial Departments, etc.); and has been repeatedly
re-endorsed at similar levels on several occasions by three successive Governments (Federal and
Provincial)  since then, sometimes  in the face of mounting opposition from  organized groups
(notably  large  landholders,  feudal landlords,  and  some  officials  of  PIDs).  The  federal  and
Provincial  Governments have engaged in extensive consultations with the various stakeholders
(including  politicians,  organized  farmer  groups,  Chambers  of  Agriculture,  Provincial
Departments, etc.) to build consensus and win acceptance of the reforn  program, including on
the  PIDA  Acts.  The  political  and  wide-ranging  support  for the  reform program  was  most
recently demonstrated in the enactment of the PIDA Ordinance by all the four interim Provincial
Governments (January, 1997) and the reenactment of the PIDA Ordinances as PIDA Acts by the
Assemblies thereafter (July, 1997).  The extensive debate on the reform strategy, wide-ranging
consultations,  and the resulting education about the reforms have lowered the perceived threats24
of the reforms to a large degree.  The risk mitigation strategy is: (i) to continue to  encourage
political  debate about irrigation policy in Pakistan, and thereby help build both conscious top-
level political ownership and widespread support among the various stakeholders for the reform
program;  (ii)  strengthen the  constituency for reforms  through  extensive  technical  assistance,
communication  and  beneficiary  participation  programs;  and  (iii)  establish  institutional  focal
points in the Federal Government, WAPDA, and Provincial Governments and provide technical
assistance  to  create  the  necessary  incentives  and  mandates,  and  equip  them  with  the
resources/capacity to function as agents for institutional change.
With respect to the risk of slow or imperfect formation of FOs, the risk-mitigation factors
are as follows: (i) the most important factor mitigating this risk is the expected encouragement
from  positive results  of on-going pilots of FOs.  These pilots would  also help to  reduce the
perceived threats to the interests of the opponents of reforms in the sector.  The early results from
these pilot projects indicate that FOs are socially viable i.e., with appropriate social engineering
techniques,  it  is  possible  to  form  user  groups in  the prevailing  socio-cultural  and  political
environment.  The pilots have also identified a need for these user groups to be empowered and
authorized to carry out economic activities i.e., to manage the tertiary level system (IIMI, 1997).
The project's  farmer participation plan includes a special effort to replicate lessons from current
pilots, and to implement early action plans to build FOs; (ii) the selection criteria for Investment
Projects in NDP provides built-in incentives for formation of FOs (since the selection criteria
specifies that on-farm drainage and irrigation up to the minor/ distributary level would be carried
out by  FOs);  (iii) social mobilization  activities and  awareness  initiatives, the  front-end cost-
sharing  arrangements  for  investments  (which  would  necessarily  require  consultation  with
beneficiaries), and assistance to the private sector for providing contracting services for on-farm
subsurface drainage facilities, would facilitate formation of FOs; and (iv) the PIDA Acts clearly
define the roles and responsibilities of FOs which include the management of the tertiary system.25
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Matrix 1: INSTITUTIONAL  REFORMS  IN PROVINCES  - POTENTIAL  WINNERS AND PERCEIVED  LOSERS
Reforms  Present Situation  Potential Winners  Perceived Losers
(1) Transformation of PIDs into  PIDs:  PFDs:  Fiscal savings through  PIDs:  The transformed PIDs would
autonomous PIDAs and AWBs.  reduction in subsidy to the  face a hard budget constraint, have to
This would include:  I&D sector.  be more accountable, face greater
a) Linking of revenues and  a) No linkage between  financial scrutiny (due to greater
expenditures (hitherto, the PIDs  expenses and revenues of PIDs  Federal Government: (a)  transparency requirements), would
were only concerned about the  Fiscal savings through  have to cut costs and possibly reduce
expenditures).  reduction in costs on drainage;  staffing, and would have to raise more
b) Achievement of financial self-  b) Funded fully by the state,  (b) Long-term financial  revenues.
sustainability within stipulated  No financial self-  sustainability of the I&D
period  sustainability.  system.  Large farmers/landlords: (a) In the
c) Cost reduction including  c) Financial health dependent  current system, they have good control
possible reduction in staffing  only on increased water  Large Farmers: Direct  over the PIDs.  The playing field
charges.  beneficiaries of any efficiency  would now change; (b) They would
d) Revenue enhancement through  d) Revenues are collected only  gains (e.g.: through better  possibly have to pay more for water -
increase in user charges,  from the agricultural sector.  operation and maintenance of  they currently get it for a very low
broadening of the charge  the irrigation and drainage  price.
include urban and industrial  infrastructure, cost reduction).
users, etc.  Provincial Revenue Departments:
e) Financial transparency.  e) No transparent or published  Small Farmers:  Direct  They are currently in charge of
accounts; Not tested for  beneficiaries of any efficiency  revenue collection.  This function
financial health.  gains (e.g.: through better  would now devolve to the PIDAs and
operation and maintenance of  AWBs.
f) Corporate governance.  f) Non-existent  the irrigation and drainage
infrastructure, cost reduction).
g) Transparency in water  g) No water allocation and
allocation and distribution.  distribution rules.29
Reforms  Present Situation  Potential Winners  Perceived Losers
(2) Transfer of responsibilities  Water distribution and  Small Farmers:  FOs would  Large Farmers: Formation of FOs
for management of the system  drainage systems are managed  help in more equitable  and the transfer of responsibilities to
at the minor and distributary  by the irrigation department of  distribution of water, and  FOs would result in loss of control
level and small drains to FOs.  the provincial government.  sharing of the benefits of  over the I&D system.  This would
FOs have no responsibilities  irrigation and drainage.  result in change in the social structure
beyond participating in canal  (feudal system) over which they have
construction.  PFDs: Fiscal savings since  traditional control.
these costs are now borne from
the state budget.  WAPDA:  Loss of the responsibilities
for carrying out on-farm drainage
PADs: They are involved in  (tubewells, tile drains, etc.).
formation of Water Users'
Associations (which are  PIDAs  and  AWBs:  (a) Reduction in
similar to FOs, but with  their role in management of the
limited functions) and see a  irrigation infrastructure at this level;
big role for themselves in  (b)  Reduced rent-extraction
formation of FOs.  opportunities since they will be
dealing with communities rather than
individual farmers.
Provincial Revenue Departments:
They are currently in charge of
revenue collection.  This function
would now devolve to FOs.
PADs:  Their role in carrying out civil
works (watercourses) would be
reduced.30
Reforms  Present Situation  Potential Winners  Perceived Losers
(3) Performance Contracts  Done by provincial  Business Community  PIDAs  and AWBs:  Today these
Awarded  to the private  sector  government departments  (Contractors):  Increased  works are carried out by the PIDs
for carrying  out O&M of I&D  through hiring of existing staff  business opportunities since  (although not carried out efficiently or
infrastructure.  (overtime), and purchase of  these works are now being  fully).  This helps the PIDs to justify
special equipment.  directly executed by the PIDs.  their staff strength and expenditure.
Farming Community:  Better
operating I&D system (since




Reduction in costs since the
private sector can carry out the
works more efficiently and in
a cost-effective manner.
(4) Establishment of water  Water trading between water  Small farmers:  (a) water  Large farmers:  Loss of the control
rights and formation of water  courses is prohibited.  Water  rights would be much more  which they today command (because
markets.  rights exist through  clearly defined; (b) water  rights are not clearly defined now).
Warabandi, but not enforced.  trading would be legitimized.
(5) Defining the operational  WAPDA and provincial PIDs  PIDAs and AWBs): They  WAPDA: Today it has full jurisdiction
jurisdictions of various  through ad-hoc distribution of  would now have operational  over drainage throughout the country,
institutions in the water sector.  responsibilities handle  jurisdiction over intra-  and over inter-provincial irrigation
development and operation of  provincial drainage functions,  infrastructure.  The redefined role
the water sector.  which hitherto were carried  would force WAPDA to move away
out by WAPDA.  from large-scale construction role, and
change to a 'knowledge management'
role, and construction and
management of inter-provincial
irrigation and drainage.
Note: PIDs will transform to PIDAs and AWBs after the first reform will take place.  At the time of publication ofthis paper PIDs have already
been transformed into PIDAs.  The AWBs will be established in each province on cannal comands one year after enactment of the PIDA Acts.31
Matrix 2: ACTIONS TAKEN BY INTEREST GROUPS FOR AND AGAINST THE REFORMS
Reform  Means by which Parties Affect Reform Achievement Levels
(1) Transformation of PIDs into  Federal Government:  (a) cajoling Provinces; (b) holding out 'carrot'  of donor funds (and
autonomous PIDAs and AWBs. This  coercing them about risk of loss of donor funds if reforms are not implemented); (c)
would include:  presidential involvement - invoking Presidential directives and persuasion; (d) promoting
interest groups in favor of reformn;  (e) providing advice and technical assistance support; (f)
a) Linking of revenues and  providing co-ordination function.
expenditures (hitherto, the PIDs were
only concerned about the  PIDs:  (a) indulging in bureaucratic delay tactics and stalling including continuous whittling
expenditures).  down of reform proposals at various stages; (b) providing misinformation to political bosses;
b) Achievement of financial self-  (c) collaborating with opponents notably large landlords; (d) providing misinformation in
sustainability within stipulated period  media.
c) Cost reduction including possible  PFDs:  Passive support to reforms since this is only one of their several responsibilities and
reduction in staffing  interests, lack of time and energy to devote to the reform process.
d) Revenue enhancement through
increase in user charges, broadening  PRDs:  Passive opposition to reforms since this is only one of their several responsibilities
of the charges includes urban and  and interests.
industrial users, etc.
Large farmers:  (a) providing mis-information in media; (b) providing misinformation to
e) Financial transparency  politicians with whom they carry lot of influence; (c) collaborating with other opponents
f) Corporate Governance  notably PIDs.
g) Transparency in water allocation
and distribution.  Small farmers:  Passive players (in the absence of concerted efforts to get them organized
and involved).  Not much influence because of lack of organization, understanding of issues,
and means to participate and influence reforms.32
Reform  Means by which Parties Affect Reform Achievement Levels
(2) Transfer of responsibilities for  Federal Government:  (a) providing co-ordination function; (b) persuading other players.
management of the system at the
minor and distributary level and  PIDAs and AWBs:  (a) indulging in bureaucratic delays and stalling tactics; (b) indulging in
small drains to FOs.  obstruction tactics (such as blocking off water to distributaries or minors); (c) providing
misinformation to political bosses including creating fear that the I&D system would
degenerate because of lack of O&M.
PADs:  (a) showing positive results from early pilots; (b) carrying out active social
mobilization efforts to form FOs; (c) using experience from watercourse improvement
activities and expand these activities.
WAPDA: (a) not providing technical assistance and information in areas of expertise such as
tile drains; (b) 'crowding out'  - not providing opportunity for FOs to carry out these activities.
PFDs: Passive support since this is only one of their several responsibilities.
Large farmers: (a) using existing social power-hold to frustrate social mobilization efforts
and prevent formation of FOs; (b) providing misinformation to political friends; (c) providing
misinformation in media.
Small farmers:  Passive players  (in the absence of concerted efforts to get them organized
and involved).  Not much influence because of lack of organization, understanding of issues,
and means to participate and influence reforms.33
Reform  Means by which Parties Affect Reform Achievement Levels
(3) Performance Contracts Awarded  Federal Government:  (a) providing co-ordination function; (b) persuading other players.
to the private sector for carrying out
O&M of I&D infrastructure.  PIDAs and AWBs: (a) indulging in bureaucratic delays and stalling tactics; (b) creating
procurement delays; (c) questioning cost-effectiveness of this arrangement; (d) questioning
competence of contractors to carry out O&M; (e) providing arguments that they have existing
capacity which would be wasted.
PFDs:  Passive players since they do not get involved in details of I&D operations.
Large farmers: Passive players since they are not very interested in the operational aspects
of PIDAs and AWBs.
Small farmers: Passive players  (in the absence of concerted efforts to get them organized
and involved).  Not much influence because of lack of organization, understanding of issues,
and means to participate and influence reforms.
Contractors: Limited influence on policy decisions such as contracting out to the private
sector.
(4) Establishment of water rights  Federal Government:  (a) providing co-ordination function; (b) carrying out of studies; (c)
and formation of water markets.  persuading other players.
PIDAs and AWBs:  (a) providing mis-information to political bosses; (b) providing
misinformation in media; (c) creating scare about privatization of water; (d) frustrating efforts
to develop physical infrastructure required.
Large farmers: (a) providing mis-information to political friends; (b) providing
misinformation in media; (c) creating scare about privatization of water.
Small farmers: Passive players (in the absence of concerted efforts to get them organized and
involved).  Not much influence because of lack of organization, understanding of issues, and
means to participate and influence reforms.34
Reform  Means by which  Parties  Affect Reform Achievement  Levels
(5) Defining the operational  Federal  Government:  (a) issuing directives; (b) persuading other players; (c) providing co-
jurisdictions  of various  institutions  ordination function; (d) stopping approval and funding of schemes which do not come within
in the water sector.  the agreed operational  jurisdiction  framework.
PIDAs and AWBs:  (a) demonstrating ability to carry out increased responsibilities  in
selected areas; (b) bringing political pressure through Provincial politicians.
WAPDA:  (a) continuing to prepare and execute projects outside its operational jurisdiction;
(b) creating doubts about capability of PIDAs, AWBs  and FOs to carry out their functions.35
Matrix 3: COST TO PARTIES,  OF IMPACTING  REFORMS'  ACHIEVEMENT  LEVEL
Here we refer to the cost to a party (such as Small farmers) that supports/opposes a given reform.  For example, to the Federal  Government to
support a Low (L), Partial (P), and Full (F) achievement rates of reform 1 (Transformation of PIDs...) it takes Small (S), Medium (M), and High
(H) cost, respectively.
Reform  Cost to the Parties of Impacting Reform Achievement Levels
Federal  PIDs  PIDAs  WAPDA  PFDs  PADs  PRDs  Large  Small  Contractor
Govt.  and AWBs  Farmer  Farme  s
_______  ___  !  1  ___  ___  ___  s  rs
Cost (Small, Medium, High) Associated with Impact on Various Reforrm  Achievement Levels (Low, Partial, Full)
Reform Achievement  L  P  F  L  P  F  L  P  F  L  P  F  L  P  F  L  P  F  L  P  F  L  P  F  L  P  F  L  P  F
Level -+





(2) Transfer of  S  MH  M  M  S  H  S  H  H  H  S  M H  H H H  S  S  H H  H
responsibilities for
management of the
system at the minor
and distributary level
and small drains to
FOs.
(3) Performance  S  S  M  H  M  S  H  H  H  MH  WHH  M  H  H
Contracts Awarded to
the private sector for
carrying out O&M of
I&D infrastructure.36









Notes:  (a) Blank cells mean that the player is not significantly affected by the reform (See also Matrix 1)
(b)  PIDs will transform to PIDAs and AWBs  after the first reform  takes place,  and hence  cells for  PIDs are blank  after first reform.37
Matrix 4: REFORMS ACHEEMENT  LEVELS
Reform  Reform Achievement Level
High/Full  Medium/Partial  Low/Failure
(1) Transformation of PIDs into
autonomous PIDAs and AWBs.  This
would include:
a) Linking of revenues and expenditures  Revenues  and  expenditures  Revenues and expenditures
(hitherto, the PIDs were only concerned  accrue to the same entity.  accrue to separate entities (e.g.:
about the expenditures).  water charges accrue to the
general treasury rather than to
the PIDA).
b)  Achievement  of  financial  self-  Subsidy to PIDAs and AWBs  Subsidy to PIDAs and AWBs  Subsidy to PIDAs, AWBs and
sustainability within stipulated period  for recurrent expenditures  for recurrent expenditures not  FOs remains at current levels,
reduced to zero in 10 years; and  reduced to zero in 20 years; and  and may even increase.
subsidy to FOs reduced to zero  subsidy to FOs reduced to zero
in 7 years.  in 15 years.
c)  Cost  reduction  including  possible  Cost reduction of 3% per year in  No cost reduction-  Costs remain  Costs increase in real terms by
reduction in staffing  real terms from current levels.  the same in real terms.  1% and above per year.
d) Revenue enhancement through  Increase in revenues of 15% p.a.  Increase in revenues of 10% p.a.  Increase in revenues by 0-5%
increase in user charges, broadening of  (real terms).  (real terms)  p.a. (real terms).
the charges includes urban and
industrial users, etc.
e) Financial transparency  Full disclosure of financial  Accounts maintained on  Accounts maintained on
position, accounts according to  commercial basis, but not  government accounting basis; no
generally accepted standards.  adhering to generally accepted  disclosure.
______________________________  standards, partial disclosure.38
Reform  Reform Achievement Level
High/Full  MediumilPartial  Low/Failure
f) Corporate  Governance  Full separation  of ownership  Separation  of ownership  from  Government  interferes  in
from management. No  management.  Government  internal  management  of the
government  interference  in  interference  in some internal  PIDAs,  AWBs and FOs.
internal  management  of PIDAs,  matters  such as staffing,  pricing,  Government  procedures  apply
AWBs and FOs including  etc.; but compensates  for any  for the internal  working  of the
appointment  of key staff.  mandates  imposed  on them.  PIDAs,  AWBs and FOs.
Government  compensates  Government  does not
PIDAs,  AWBs  and FOs for any  compensate  for any mandates
mandates imposed on them.  imposed on them.
g) Transparency  in water allocation  and  Information  is systematically  Lack of systematic  collection  No collection  of data on water
distribution.  and properly  collected,  analyzed  and analysis;  but available  distribution  and allocation,  or no
and publicly disclosed.  information  is disclosed.  disclosure  of available
information.
(2) Transfer  of responsibilities  for  FOs established  and take over  FOs established  and take over  Very slow formation  of FOs.
management  of the system  at the minor  100%  of minors  and  50% of distributaries  and minors  Only few and isolated  pilots.
and distributary  level and small drains  distributaries  and small drains in  and small drains in 10  years;
to FOs.  10  years.  100%  in 20 years.
(3) Performance  Contracts  Awarded  to  O&M carried  out through  O&M  in 25% of area carried  out  O&M carried out through  force-
the private sector  for carrying  out O&M  contracts awarded  to private  through contracts  awarded  to  account  by PIDAs  and AWBs.
of I&D infrastructure.  sector in 50%  of total area in 5  private sector  in 5 years; and
years; and 100%  in 10  years.  50% in 10  years
(4) Establishment  of water  rights and  Water rights established  and  Trading  in water legalized. No  No steps taken for establishment
formation  of water  markets.  water markets  fully functioning  formal  water  rights and water  of water  rights and water
in 15 years (at watercourse  and  markets;  but informal  trading  markets.
canal command  level).  allowed  and takes place within
Necessary  legal and regulatory  and between  watercourses.
framework in place.39
Reform  Reform  Achievement  Level
High/Full  Medium/Partial  Low/Failure
(5) Defining  the operational  Agreed  operational  jurisdictions  Formal  division  of operational  No clear division  of operational
jurisdictions of various  institutions  in  are fully  followed. WAPDA  jurisdictions established.  jurisdictions. WAPDA  still
the water sector.  gets out of construction  and  However,  not fully followed  in  involved  in construction and
O&M of on-farm  and intra-  practice. Some adhoc  O&M  of on-farm  and intra-
provincial  drainage. AWBs  are  arrangements  established  for  provincial  drainage.
established  in all canal  specific areas/schemes.  Very
commands  and are responsibk  few AWBs established  -
for intra  canal command  activities  under their jurisdiction
irrigation  and drainage.  carried  out by PIDAs.40
Matrix 5: PROBABILITIES OF REFORMS' ACHIEVEMENT LEVELS
Given the information in Matrixes 1-4, the experts selected for the Delphi process on the basis of their
familiarity with the water and drainage politics in the country, provide their subjective estimate of the
probability of level (Low, Partial, Full) of reform achievement.





For example, taking the first reform, one's subjective estimate is that a Low achievement level is 50-75%
likely to happen; a Partial achievement level is 25-50% likely to happen; and a Full achievement level is
0-25% likely to happen.
Note: the horizontal sum over the probabilities in the three cells of each reform may exceed 100%.
Reform Achievement Level
Reform  Low  I  Partial  I  Full
Probability of Occurrence (%)
(1) Transformation of PIDs into autonomous PIDAs and
AWBs; and associated reforms
(2) Transfer of responsibilities for management of the
system at the minor and distributary level and small drains
to FOs.
(3) Performance Contracts Awarded to the private sector
for carrying out O&M of  I&D  infrastructure.
(4) Establishment of water rights and formation of water
markets.
(5) Defining the operational jurisdictions of various
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